Bailed-out governments did not lose policy-making discretion during the Eurozone crisis

By Catherine MouryStella Ladi*, Daniel Cardoso and Angie Gago The Loop

Re-blogged

Authors argue that bailed-out governments during the Eurozone crisis exercised more leverage than assumed. Despite international market pressure and creditors’ conditionality, bailed-out governments were able to advocate, resist, shape or roll back some of the policies demanded by the EU’s Troika ……

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*Stella Ladi is a Reader at Queen Mary University of London, an Associate Professor at Panteion University in Athens and the co-author of Capitalising on constraint: Bailout politics in Eurozone countries

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